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ABSTRACT
How Psychology’s Empirical Results Can Benefit the Criminal Justice System: Expert
Testimony
by
Ford Charles McCurry
Brigham and Bothwell (1983) claimed that jurors have a scientifically incorrect view of
eyewitness testimony. The purpose of this study was to examine the most beneficial way to
assist the jury in dealing with eyewitness testimony. Duckworth, Kreiner, Stark-Wroblewski,
and Marsh (2011) applied interactive participation in an eyewitness activity and expert testimony
to a mock-jury dealing with eyewitness testimony and found that those who participated in the
activity had significantly fewer convictions. The methodological framework of the Duckworth et
al. study was applied to East Tennessee State University criminal justice undergraduates.
Although this study did not find any significant effects in hearing expert testimony on empirical
findings regarding eyewitness testimony or participating in an individual recall activity, cross
tabulation frequencies indicated a directional pattern of relationship when independent variables
were compared to the control group.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system strives to protect the innocent and proportionally punish the
offenders who have disrupted society. When a guilty person is sentenced and an innocent person
is set free by the judge and jury within the courtroom, there is a sense of fairness being carried
out by the criminal justice system. There is a feeling of security and assurance when an
eyewitness claims to have seen someone commit the crime (Leippe, 1995). By having
eyewitness testimony present in a case, there is greater comfort that the truth will be made
known inside the courtroom. Eyewitness testimony is significant and important due to the
ramifications that can stem from this type of evidence. Eyewitness testimony can be a means to
ensure the guilty defendant will be prosecuted and convicted. There is a reassuring feeling inside
the courtroom when a person claims to have witnessed an event because the desire rests upon
achieving the truth in what happened concerning the court case (Leippe, 1995). However, it can
also cause justice to be withheld if the eyewitness is unable to tell the truth for whatever reason.
More disconcerting is that research has shown eyewitness testimony contains inaccurate
reflections of what the witnesses claim happened (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986), further
confounding the issue. Believing false eyewitness testimony can lead to innocent people
suffering a wrongful conviction and imprisonment for a crime they did not commit. For this
reason, erroneous eyewitness testimony has caused serious focus to be placed upon this
particular event within the courtroom.
When eyewitness testimony becomes a deciding factor in a courtroom verdict, many
consequences rest on whether or not the testimony depicts what actually happened. Inaccurate
eyewitness testimony may cause innocent people to lose their freedom, while allowing the
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person responsible for the crime to escape his or her punishment (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
People, for good or bad, draw a connection between an eyewitness’s claim and the truth (Leippe,
1995).
Eyewitness Testimony
When eyewitness testimony becomes a factor in a court case, this allows the possibility
of error in conviction. If there is inaccurate evidence in the testimony, it can lead to error in
convicting the wrong person. Cases that led to exoneration of suspects are likely to have
involved inaccurate eyewitness testimony that caused wrongful sentencing (Borchard, 1933;
Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996; Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, & Patil,
2005). Flowe, Mehta, and Ebbeson (2010) analyzed the presence of eyewitness identification in
725 felony case convictions. Defendants who had eyewitness testimony linking them to a crime
often received felony convictions (Flowe et al., 2010). Flowe et al.'s results are evidence of the
impact eyewitness testimony can have on a courtroom decision.
Having an eyewitness testify toward a cause is one of the most powerful weapons
concerning a courtroom case (Brandon & Davies, 1973). However, research has revealed
eyewitness testimony as playing a significant role in wrongful sentencing (Gross et al., 2005;
Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2001). Yarmey (2001) claimed that erroneous eyewitness
testimonies were the leading causes in wrongful convictions. According to the National
Institute of Justice, during 1996, there were 28 wrongful convictions that used eyewitness
testimonies (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Connors et al. (1996) found that the 28
cases used DNA evidence to rebut the original eyewitness testimonies that resulted in a wrongful
conviction. If not for DNA analysis, these individuals would have continued to serve a sentence
due to inaccurate eyewitness testimonies (Connors et al., 1996). Although DNA testing
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exonerated these people, their life has been forever impacted by false accusation from an
eyewitness testimony.
Organizations have been formed to specifically address the correlation of eyewitness
testimony and wrongful convictions, specifically the Innocence Project and the National Registry
of Exonerations. According to the Innocence Project, eyewitness testimony is the leading cause
in all exonerations that involved DNA analysis; nearly 75% of exonerated cases (Innocence
Project, 1992). The University of Michigan Law School and the Center on Wrongful Convictions
at Northwestern University School of Law have collaborated to put together a National Registry
of Exonerations (Gross & Shaffer, 2012). The National Registry of Exonerations released its
first report in June of 2012, which discussed information regarding the 873 exonerated cases
from 1989 through 2012 (Gross & Shaffer, 2012). They found that 43% of the 873 exonerated
cases were traced to incorrect eyewitness identification. This high percentage of error
demonstrates a problem in evaluating eyewitness testimony as a reflection of the true event.
Assistance to a Jury on the Memory Process
A juror's reaction to eyewitness testimony is one problem that plays a role in wrongful
convictions due to erroneous testimony.

Wise, Dauphanais, and Safer (2007) emphasized the

influence of eyewitness testimony within the courtroom because of the ramifications it can have
upon a jury’s decision. These ramifications include wrongfully convicting and sentencing of
innocent people due to a jury believing an inaccurate eyewitness testimony. As a result of how
influential and significant eyewitness testimony is to the criminal justice system, empirical
studies have been conducted to try and find ways of improving a jury’s ability to better judge
eyewitness testimony in order to reduce the number of errors made relating to eyewitness
testimony (Loftus & Monahan, 1980; Lindsey, Wells, & Rumple, 1981; McClosky & Egeth,
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1983). A jury may place too much faith in the eyewitness’s testimony because of their opinion
about how memory works (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983). Brigham and Bothwell (1983) claimed
that jurors have a scientifically incorrect view of the eyewitness recall process. Jurors may not
understand the scientific process of memory and, therefore, make wrong assumptions due to
believing that an eyewitness recall will be a complete reflection of what truly happened. When
an eyewitness gives his or her testimony, the jury is likely to believe it is an accurate reflection
of what really happened (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983).
In order to better understand eyewitness testimony, it is useful to understand how
memory works. The problem in convictions derived from erroneous testimonies inspired
Elizabeth Loftus to begin one of her first publications on eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness
Testimony (1979) was published to show the scientific breakdown on why so many eyewitness
testimonies are often shown to be incorrect. Loftus (1979) brought attention to empirical studies
on eyewitness testimony, which would in turn be applied inside the courtroom. Unless the
members of the courtroom have prior knowledge about the scientific process of memory, then it
is unrealistic to believe they will be able to accurately judge eyewitness testimony.
In order to better understand and gauge the accuracy of someone's eyewitness testimony,
jurors needed to learn the fundamental stages of how memory occurs (Loftus, 1979). The
memory process can be broken down into a three-step process: acquisition, retention, and
retrieval (Loftus, 1979). Loftus (1979) used the process of memory to provide a foundation so
that aspects of eyewitness testimony would have a point of reference for jurors. By
understanding how memory works through acquisition, retention, and retrieval, it can serve as a
way for jurors to have a sense of skepticism toward gauging eyewitness testimony as the
complete truth. Skepticism will serve as a means for jurors not to automatically base their
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decision on a person claiming to have witnessed an event. Instead, once the jurors are provided
with information regarding the memory process, then they can apply this knowledge in judging
the eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1979). The goal of providing a jury with scientific evidence
regarding the memory process is to better equip the individual jurors for analyzing eyewitness
testimony.
The first stage of the memory process is known as acquisition, which is also known as the
encoding process (Loftus, 1979). Encoding refers to the way the brain takes in information to be
stored, such as the color of a person's hat (Loftus, 1979). The brain must encode information in
order to recall it at later time. During the acquisition process, the brain chooses which aspects are
most important to pay attention to while encoding the information (Loftus, 1979). The
surrounding environment will often be filled with numerous pieces of information that the brain
could focus on acquiring. Because of the high number of details, there are often many aspects
that go unnoticed while encoding the event. The brain cannot focus on every detail, so the
acquisition stage of encoding will usually focus on a small proportion of the actual event.
After the brain encodes the event, the information is then stored for retention (Loftus,
1979). The retention stage is the process of preserving the encoded information for however
long it will be stored in the mind until asked to recall the event (Loftus, 1979). The retention
stage undergoes more tension regarding the specific event that was encoded. Once the event has
been acquired by the brain, there are chances that it can be manipulated by outside factors such
as a personal bias from other people. If a personal bias, such as racial prejudice, from other
people frame the discussion of the event, it can cause the person to question whether his or her
acquisition of the event was true. An example of racial prejudice framing an event would be if
another witness insists the person of a different race was the culprit in the crime only because of
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his or her prejudice beliefs and not on what he or she actually saw, then the racial bias could
cause additional witnesses to question what they saw. Depending on how influential the
discussion is, the retention could significantly change the person's idea on the event he or she
encoded during the acquisition stage.
The acquisition and retention stage serve to keep the information as accurate as possible
for when it is needed (Loftus, 1979). The last stage, known as retrieval, is when the person is
asked to give an account of the event or information (Loftus, 1979). The retrieval stage can be
affected by the strength of the acquisition and retention stage. The better a person is able to
encode and store an event will lead to a greater chance of a more accurate reflection of what
occurred. The surrounding circumstances and other factors such as self-questioning the event at
any stage of the memory process can cause inaccuracies during the recall process.
Memory recall can also be affected by the surrounding environment and the overall
temperament of the person (Loftus, 1979). After Loftus established the three stage process of
memory, she explained other factors that can affect the accuracy in recalling an event. Event
factors surrounding the situation, such as the amount of time the witness is exposed to the event
and the frequency of exposure, can play an influential role in decreasing the accuracy of recall,
by affecting the acquisition process of memory. Highly salient details of an event can also affect
the acquisition. Salience of detail could be whether or not the event has a high probability of
being noticed. A large red hat in a crowd would be an example of a salient detail in an
environment. The type of fact that the witness is asked to recall can also play a role in the
probability of successful acquisition, retention, and retrieval. If the event details have a high
probability of over or under estimation, such as weight, then the type of fact could be understood
to have possibility of error. Loftus also pointed out that the amount of violence perceived in the
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event could affect a person's ability to retain accurate details. Haber and Haber (2000) argued
that the presence of a weapon or violence can cause a person to focus more upon what could
potentially lead to harm, therefore lessening the person's ability to focus on other details of the
situation.
Event factors are not the only agents that can affect the memory process. Factors that
derive from the witness's state of mind can also influence the accuracy of memory (Loftus,
1979). Witness factors can include the amount of stress a person is under at the time of the event
(Loftus, 1979). Greater stress can cause impairment for the memory process. Stress makes it
more difficult to accurately acquire, retain, and recall information. Inherent factors such as
personal bias can also be affected by a person’s expectations of an event. When a person has
preconceived prejudices concerning types of people and events, then his or her personal biases
may get in the way of seeing the truth in the situation. The person may assume that the assailant
in a robbery was of a certain class or race due to a personal bias that perceives that only certain
classes or races would be involved in a robbery.
Memory can also be influenced by the depth of focus a person displays on the event. The
depth of focus or type of perceptual activity a witness is going through during an event can affect
how well it will be accurately recalled. When studying this phenomenon, Loftus (1979) used the
Bower and Karlin (1974) study to explain the relationship of perceptual activity and the accuracy
of recalling an event. In the study, one group was asked to judge the personality of an individual
by only looking at a face, while another group was asked to judge the sex of a person (Bower &
Karlin, 1974). The group that participated in personality judging scored higher when asked to
recall the faces.
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In conclusion, if jurors can be exposed to the elements of the memory process, it can
provide greater hope in being able to decipher an eyewitness's testimony. By having a better
understanding in how memory works and what elements can make it harder to remember
information, the jury may be able to adequately decide whether the eyewitness testimony can be
assumed as an accurate reflection of the event. Loftus (1979) argued that the first step in
assisting the problem of inaccurate eyewitness testimony is educating the jury on scientific
findings concerning how memory occurs. Providing scientific findings on memory to the
members of the jury can help remove the problem of automatically believing an eyewitness is, in
fact, accurate.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to address the debate of incorporating expert testimony
into the courtroom by providing a mock jury composed of East Tennessee State University
undergraduate criminal justice students with expert testimony and participation in a related
eyewitness recall activity to see if there would be an effect on their evaluation of hearing an
eyewitness account. Jurors' final decisions of guilty or not guilty were evaluated after being
provided with scientific findings on the process of memory regarding eyewitness testimony. The
use of an interactive activity involving eyewitness recall's impact on the jury’s final verdict was
also addressed. The combined effect of hearing expert witness testimony and participation in an
interactive recall activity was also evaluated. The literature suggests that interactive learning
can have a more powerful impact than simply listening (Chickering & Gamson, 1987); therefore,
this study combined the use of expert testimony exposure and participation in an interactive
learning activity in order to see if there was an effect when both situations were given to
participants.
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Duckworth, Kreiner, Stark-Wroblewski, and Marsh (2011) conducted a study that tested
the effect of presenting participants with a mock-trial to see whether expert testimony or an
eyewitness activity would have a stronger effect on the final verdict of guilty or not guilty.
Duckworth et al. had two independent variables: exposure to expert testimony and participation
in an eyewitness identification activity. They predicted and confirmed that participation in the
activity would show a significant relationship to how the mock-jury voted (Duckworth et al.,
2011). This current study applied Duckworth et al.'s methodological framework to East
Tennessee State University undergraduate criminal justice students. The impact of expert
testimony compared to participation in an eyewitness activity when East Tennessee State
University students were asked to render a verdict based upon eyewitness testimony was
statistically measured.
Hypotheses
This question of whether it is effective to incorporate expert testimony in the courtroom
was addressed in this study. The effect of expert testimony and the effect of participating in a
hands-on eyewitness recall activity on mock jurors were statistically tested. The first set of
experimental hypotheses were : H1: there would be a significant difference the final decision of
guilty or not guilty between the participants who were exposed to expert witness testimony
compared to those in the control group, H2: there would be a significant difference in the final
decision of guilty or not guilty between the participants who participated in an eyewitness recall
activity compared to the control group, and H3: there would be a significant difference in the
final decision of guilty or not guilty between the group that heard the expert witness testimony
and participated in the eyewitness recall activity compared to the control group.
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The effect of mock jurors finding helpfulness in hearing expert testimony and
participating in the eyewitness recall activity was also statistically tested. The second set of
experimental hypotheses were: H4: the mock jurors would find helpfulness of hearing expert
witness testimony to be statistically significant in providing assistance to their verdict when the
group that only heard the expert witness testimony was compared to the control group, H5: the
mock jurors would find the helpfulness in participating in the eyewitness recall activity to be
statistically significant in providing assistance to their verdict when the group that participated
in the eyewitness recall activity was compared to the control group. These were based on the
existing research results (Duckworth et al., 2011; Loftus, 1980).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Loftus (1979) conducted an empirical study that showed the overall weight of having
eyewitness testimony presented in a courtroom trial. Participants were given a courtroom
scenario of a robbery-murder trial, and then were divided into three separate conditions (Loftus,
1979). In the first condition, participants were only given the physical evidence regarding the
crime. The second condition provided physical evidence and an eyewitness. The participants in
the first group had an 18% conviction rate, while the second group had a 72% conviction rate.
However, in the third condition the eyewitness’s testimony was discredited by the defense
attorney, but the group still had a 68% conviction rate. The comparison of conviction rates
among the groups with an eyewitness increased dramatically. This experiment showed that the
mere presence of an eyewitness raises conviction rates, whether it is an accurate testimony or
not. Therefore, it makes sense to seek the most effective way to make sure a jury is able to
accurately decide whether or not an eyewitness testimony can be believed. Empirical findings
are an attempt to establish effective conclusions regarding the use of expert assistance in helping
a jury deal with eyewitness testimonies.
Expert Testimony as Assistance to the Jury
Empirical findings showed that juries do have trouble in detecting whether an eyewitness
is giving an accurate account of what actually happened (Loftus & Monahan, 1980; Lindsey et
al., 1981). McClosky and Egeth (1983) discussed the solution to the problem associated with
the notion of juries being more likely to believe an eyewitness solely based on good hope that the
witness is telling the truth and that the memory is more than likely going to be accurate. The
solution to this problem was to provide the jury with an expert who deals with the scientific
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findings regarding the memory process (McClosky & Egeth, 1983). In order to provide the jury
with more information that may help them be able to better differentiate between accurate and
inaccurate eyewitness testimony, there has been a movement to encourage the participation of
psychologists inside the courtroom (McClosky & Egeth, 1983). Because experimental and
cognitive psychologists have firsthand exposure to research and empirical findings regarding the
memory process, eyewitness testimony, and factors that can affect accurate or inaccurate recall,
they are wanted to testify to the jury as an expert on eyewitness testimonies. Expert testimony by
a psychologist refers to someone that is qualified to inform the jury and judge on empirical
findings, theories, and processes that the community of researchers and professionals have
reached an overall agreement on concerning the process of memory and eyewitness testimony
(Leippe, 1995).
The psychologist, also known as the expert witness, would explain to the court how
memory truly works and explain certain factors that are likely to impede the memory process
(Wise et al., 2007). The expert witness testimony is to solely inform the court by providing
reliable and valid results of the scientific community’s findings on memory. The expert witness
does not offer opinions about the current case in the courtroom (Cutler et al., 1989). The use of
incorporating expert witness into the courtroom to provide the jury with professional and
scientific evidence developed as a way to give juries a way to better understand the components
of eyewitness testimony so that they would have the tools to better differentiate between a
witness who is giving an accurate account of an eyewitness event or a witness who is not
providing the truth.
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Legal Rulings Involving Expert Testimony
The notion of providing expert testimony to a jury was transferred from the research
setting in academia to the courtroom. Frye v. United States (1923) established that testimony is
admissible if there is established acceptance of a particular theory or evidence. Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence eventually became the legal standard regarding allowing expert
testimony. According to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court has the right to
allow the admission of a qualified expert witness if the testimony is directly related from the
field of experience that can impact the ruling of a case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) addressed the admission of expert testimony in federal courts if the
judges believe the expert can testify directly based upon established scientific evidence that can
relate specifically to the case at hand. It is up to the discretion of the judge as to whether the
expert will be giving testimony directly from scientific knowledge, and then whether or not the
scientific input is necessary for trying to reach the final verdict (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993).
If the judge allows the presentation of an expert witness, the expert is to raise awareness
about the memory process by expanding on what the scientific research has found. Vidmar and
Schuller (1989) refer to incorporating expert witness testimony as assistance from the scientific
field. The psychologist’s job is to bring awareness regarding the memory and eyewitness
process, not personally evaluate the credibility of the eyewitness. The ultimate decision on
whether to credit the eyewitness testimony is still placed upon the jury (Monahan & Walker,
1988). The expert is designed to help or provide clarity for the lay jury to better understand the
eyewitness process (Monahan & Walker, 1988). The process of the jury involves taking into
account what the eyewitness expert says about the process of memory and what factors could
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cause a person to not accurately recall the event, and then applying this information when they
directly evaluate the eyewitness testimony.
The problem with eyewitness testimony is that sometimes jurors will believe inaccurate
observations and not believe witnesses who are actually telling the truth (McClosky & Egeth,
1983). McClosky and Egeth (1983) claim that the use of expert testimony is hopeful to inform
jurors on factors that can cause inaccurate observations and lead to testimony that is actually
false. The involvement of expert testimony moves to inform jurors on what should be relevant
factors of focus in deciding whether or not to believe an eyewitness. McClosky and Egeth
(1983) also support the incorporation of expert testimony from a psychologist based upon Ellison
and Buckout’s (1981) findings, in that there is a presumption of jurors being too ready to believe
eyewitness testimony because they feel it is the truth when in fact many circumstantial factors
that the jury is unaware of could play a role in the eyewitness being wrong. By informing the
jury on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, the expert testimony could help juries become
more cautioned to believe someone solely because they claim it is true. Loftus (1979)
encouraged incorporating a psychologists into the courtroom because they can help the jury
better understand the memory process. Expert testimony would be a solution to a jury that does
not have a lot of knowledge on how memory works.
Although it may seem straightforward and logical to use an expert witness to discuss
eyewitness testimony findings and research, there is a debate on whether it is truly effective in
the courtroom. In the case People v. Gruzman (1975), it was ruled against using expert
testimony because the jurors are screened and explained about processes beforehand and that
most people know that eyewitness testimony can be false. McClosky and Egeth (1983) made the
argument that the when a jury makes a wrongful conviction and sentences an innocent person or
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frees a guilty person because they believed a false testimony, then these situations cause society
to demand an expert witness in order to control for this type of error within the criminal justice
system. They relate this to one of the most famous criticisms of using expert testimony within
the courtroom; skepticism (McClosky & Egeth, 1983). They brought up that by exposing a jury
to expert testimony, it would increase the jurors' amount of skepticism to a point that they would
become too afraid that they would be making a mistake if they reached a guilty verdict.
Opponents of expert testimony argued that expert witnesses will add skepticism to the extent that
the jury loses its power of judgment. The jury may become so afraid that they are making a
mistake in believing the eyewitness that they will significantly lower conviction rates in a way
that would almost guarantee the defendant will walk away regardless of whether he or she was
truly innocent or if he or she was guilty. Because of the argument regarding expert witnesses
increasing the skepticism effect among juries, scientists and scholars conducted many empirical
studies to see the effects of having an expert witness involved in the courtroom.
Empirical Findings Regarding Expert Testimony
Loftus (1980) wanted to work with supposed jurors and compare outcomes when
exposed to expert testimony and the eyewitness testimony or jurors only exposed to eyewitness
testimony. This was the better way to actually see the effectiveness of incorporating expert
eyewitness testimony into the courtroom. Comparing actual case outcomes that were allowed
expert testimony to cases that were not allowed would involve too many confounding variables,
such as strength of the attorneys in fighting the case. In order to control for attorney interaction
on a case, Loftus (1980) solely addressed the impact of having expert testimony exposed to the
jury. The main effect of allowing expert testimony was investigated.
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Loftus (1980) conducted two experiments regarding expert testimony. In her first
experiment, there were two groups (Loftus, 1980). Both groups received evidence based upon
an eyewitness testimony against a defendant, but one group was exposed to expert testimony on
scientific findings regarding eyewitness testimony, while the other group did not have this
exposure. The results showed fewer convictions for the group that was exposed to expert
testimony. As was hypothesized by Loftus (1980), the group that heard an expert witness had
fewer guilty verdicts. Based on the results of experiment one, Loftus (1980) concluded that
exposing a jury to an expert witness may lead them to give more thought toward their final
verdict by further analyzing if the actual witness was telling the truth.
Loftus’s (1980) second experiment was designed to further analyze jury decisions and the
effect of exposure to expert testimony. She wanted to see if jurors spent more time discussing or
analyzing their final decision when they were exposed to expert witness testimony (Loftus,
1980). In experiment two, one group was given exposure to expert testimony and then came to
their conclusion. The other group was not given exposure to expert testimony. The group
exposed to expert testimony was recorded for how long they spent discussing and analyzing the
information provided by the expert testimony. Results indicated that groups exposed to expert
testimony took longer in discussing and reaching their final conclusion. Much like the first
experiment, the second experiment showed that groups who were exposed to expert testimony
had a lower conviction conclusion. The group with the expert witness exposure also had more
people reach an undecided verdict. Loftus (1980) argued that failing to reach the conclusion of
guilt could be attributed to the jury devoting more time analyzing the expert witness information.
The hypothesis was confirmed in that there was a significant difference in a jury spending more
time reaching a verdict when being exposed to an expert witness testimony.
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Both of these experiments provided empirical results showing that expert witness
testimony does have an influence on a jury (Loftus, 1980). The exposure to expert testimony in
the first experiment produced fewer convictions, and the second experiment showed jurors spent
more time deliberating a final verdict when they had been presented with expert testimony
(Loftus, 1980). The lower convictions and more time in deliberation could have been attributed
to expert witness causing an increased amount of skepticism in believing the eyewitness's
testimony. However, Loftus argued that incorporating an expert witness is not to make the jury
more skeptical in a way to automatically discredit the eyewitness testimony. The expert
witness’s role is to provide the jury with knowledge that increases awareness of certain factors
that are significant influences in the overall eyewitness experience.
The Debate of Expert Testimony
A jury giving more thought toward their final verdict is not necessarily a bad implication.
The results could be read in two different ways depending on whether a person is for or against
the use of expert testimony within the courtroom. An argument for expert witness testimony
based on the results of Loftus (1980) would be that the jury spends more time analyzing or
discussing the information provided by the expert witness. If the jury is spending more time
thinking about the eyewitness testimony findings regarding memory and factors that affect the
memory process, then they will be more likely to spend more time trying to apply the expert’s
advice toward the eyewitness. Providing the jury with more information on the memory process
from an expert could lead them to have a broader and more advanced understanding of
eyewitness testimony, which could lead to the jury making a more educated final decision than if
they were not exposed to the information provided by the expert.
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However, people who do not support incorporating expert witness testimony into the
courtroom would focus more upon the results of the juries having a lowered guilty conviction
rate after being exposed to expert testimony. The group that was exposed to expert testimony in
experiment one demonstrated a lowered conviction rate, which shows that there is some degree
of skepticism effect that develops from expert testimony (Loftus, 1980). Opponents of expert
testimony would argue that a jury does not need exposure to what an expert has to say regarding
the memory process and eyewitness testimony because it will automatically make them skeptical
to convict. Loftus’s (1980) results did show a lower conviction rate, but it was not an extreme
amount of decrease. More importantly, the exposure to expert testimony did not significantly
lower the guilty conviction rate to the point that expert testimony would cause the jury
completely abandon sentencing a defendant.
Critics of incorporating expert witness testimony into the courtroom not only use the
skepticism effect as a reason, but they also argue that there is a difference in the experimental
findings regarding eyewitness testimony compared to the actual courtroom (Leippe, 1995).
There has been quite an area of devotion to eyewitness recall since the 1970s (Christiaansen,
Sweeney, & Ochalek, 1983; Leippe, Wells, & Ostrom, 1978; Loftus & Greene, 1980; Loftus &
Palmer, 1974). Many of these empirical findings have high reliability and high validity (Leippe,
1995). The question deals with the transfer from the scientific setting to the actual courtroom.
The reluctance of opponents toward incorporating eyewitness testimony in the courtroom comes
from the argument that there is a difference in the testing environment and the real world setting.
However, even if there is difference in the testing compared to the real world setting, there is still
more help than harm by knowing and explaining which and how certain factors are able to affect
the eyewitness recall process. The majority of findings showed that there is a high error rate

24

when it comes to being able to accurately recall an eyewitness event. This high error rate
provided the basis for continuing experiments for the generalizability in relating expert testimony
in experimental settings to the real world.
One complaint about the generalizability aspect for the experimental atmosphere
compared to the real world atmosphere is that the experiments use mainly college students who
are not under the same degree of stress that the actual eyewitness endured (Leippe, 1995).
However, Wells (1993) found that there was not an overwhelmingly change in effects for college
students compared to nonstudent eyewitnesses. Loftus, Levidow, and Duensing (1992) found
that college students had better accuracy in recall than anyone, which would actually support the
generalizability of the classroom to the real world. If the experiments had a group that were
shown to have stronger recall and still had a high recall error rate, then it is safe to assume that
real world people would also have a similar recall rate.
Another argument against the generalizability of empirical findings is that the stress is far
different in an actual event compared to an experimental setting. Goldstein, Chance, and
Schneller (1989) claimed that the United States had over 78,000 trials in 1987 that significantly
relied upon eyewitness testimony. They propose that if a mere 10% of these trials involved
witnesses who were not put under a significant amount of stress, then that would have yielded
around 8,000 cases that involved witness that were not traumatized through the event (Goldstein
et al., 1989). People who argue against the use of expert testimony would be more likely to
support the incorporation of the empirical evidence for these approximate 8,000 cases because
both the college student participant and the actual eyewitness would not have been exposed to a
high degree of real world stress, which would make the two groups more similar. This argument
would mean that there would be little reason not to allow the use of expert testimony due to the
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actual similarities between college students and the real witness, in that, there would not be a
significant amount of stress placed on either group. This provides a strong argument that
empirical findings discussed from expert testimony would have a greater similarity to cases
where the eyewitness was not placed under a high amount of stress. However, there is still room
for debate that in instances where the eyewitness was placed under a high amount of stress, there
could be less of a similarity between empirical results and real world eyewitness events.
Therefore, opponents of using expert testimony that informs a jury of empirical findings still
argue that there is a greater chance the eyewitnesses were under different circumstances than the
participants,
Leippe (1995) makes the argument that there is clearly a difference in real world
scenarios where witnesses do face greater stress and more physical and mental strains than
students in the classroom. However, there has not been empirical evidence collected that shows
a significant difference in these two situations. There is not a great amount of evidence that
clearly sways the scientific community that there are effects that take place in real world events
that will alter and provide different findings than the empirical studies that have been conducted
across the country. Because there is no solid evidence that supports a significant and clear
difference between empirical experiments and the real world, it is safe to rely upon these
experimental results as a basis of understanding and application toward real world problems and
cases within the courtroom. That is essentially the purpose of incorporating an expert witness in
the courtroom. The expert witness is supposed to provide understanding and expose the jury to
information that may serve to aid them in their decision process when evaluating eyewitness
testimony.
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Opponents of expert witness testimony used in the courtroom argue that the jury does not
need any help evaluating an eyewitness testimony, which would make expert testimony a waste
of time and expense for the court. However, Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant’s (1980) results
showed that there are variables that affect eyewitness testimony that go beyond the cognitive
mind of the average jury. Expert testimony would help familiarize jurors with factors that are
scientifically known to make recall more difficult (Wells et al., 1980). It would make sense to
expose jurors to this information. McClosky and Egeth (1983) argue that the known variables do
not need to be explained by a psychologist. They claim the average person is skeptical when
confronted with the amount of time that lapsed between the episode and the report and also the
amount of stress that the eyewitness was under during the event (McClosky & Egeth, 1983).
Their findings suggest that it may be helpful in having an expert remind the jury of the
intricacies concerning factors that impede memory, but it is not needed because of other
employers of the criminal justice system, such as the lawyers. They argue that a defense attorney
would certainly already cover the angles of the testimony that could be causing an inaccurate
recall. If the testimony had any of the factors, such as dark lighting, extreme stress, race
identification, or a weapon involved, the defense would have more than likely already used this
against the witness. McClosky and Egeth find it redundant to allow a psychologist to explain the
scientific aspect behind these situational stresses on memory when the court already has an
attorney provided for the defendant.
Empirical research suggests that the jury does need help with being exposed to the effects
of influential factors on eyewitness memory. Deffenbacher and Loftus (1982) demonstrated that
lay people do not naturally know certain information that could be helpful regarding memory and
eyewitness testimony. They gave college students and nonstudents a survey regarding variables
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that play a substantial role in affecting memory recall (Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982). The
results showed that it is not common knowledge of the known effects for certain factors that
pertain to or hinder eyewitness memory.
Yarmey and Jones (1983) found similar results supporting the notion that the jury needs
the exposure of an expert witness on factors that relate and influence eyewitness recall. They
found that even law students and legal professionals do not automatically know the significant
impact of certain variables on memory (Yarmey & Jones, 1983). Kassin and Barndollar (1992)
conducted a study that involved the reliable factors agreed upon by the experts in the Kassin,
Ellsworth, and Smith (1989) study, which showed that there was a significant difference about
the consensus of these factors between the experts and lay people. The factors were what the
psychology field agreed upon as being clearly significant to the memory process (Kassin et al.,
1989). Stress, racial factors, the length between the time of event and the time of testimony, the
wording of questions, and unconscious transference were some of the factors that the participants
were discussing (Kassin & Barndollar, 1992). Some participants did not even agree that the
factors were even legitimate in affecting eyewitness testimony, even though the scientific
community had come to agree on them (Kassin & Barndollar, 1992). These findings refute the
argument that the jury already knows these factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness
testimony. The findings refute the idea that including an expert witness to inform the jury on
established scientific findings is a waste of the court’s time. Based upon these results, the jury
does need an expert witness to address and educate the jury on how certain factors do affect
memory. Including an expert witness would better educate the jury in regards to eyewitness
testimony.
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Refuting Opponents of Expert Testimony
In order to better understand the ongoing battle about having an expert witness
incorporated into the courtroom or not allowing an expert to testify, Leippe (1995) highlighted
the main arguments against expert testimony in order to better weigh the two opinions. Leippe
(1995) groups arguments against expert witness testimony into five main points. 1. The
scientific community has not reached a concrete conclusion on whether the findings regarding
eyewitness identification are sufficiently reliable and valid. 2. Juries do not need to be informed
about skepticism regarding eyewitness testimony. 3. By incorporating expert testimony, the jury
loses some of its responsibilities and privileges of deciding on their own the basis of whether or
not the witness is telling the truth. 4. Jurors would develop more skepticism as a result of the
expert’s testimony on the many influences and faults of eyewitness testimony. 5. The court
already provides means of examining the eyewitness testimony by the use of lawyers.
Kassin et al. (1989) conducted a survey of 63 researchers devoted to or having significant
impact in the field of expert eyewitness testimony. These factors that impede or play a
significant role in the eyewitness process include the wording of questions, lineup instructions,
postevent information, accuracy confidence, attitudes and expectations, exposure time,
unconscious transference, show-ups, forgetting curve, cross-racial identification, lineup fairness,
time estimation, and the overall stress of the situation (Kassin et al., 1989). The survey revealed
that there is a degree of consensus in the field regarding the factors that are pertinent to
eyewitness testimony should be discussed on the witness stand, which supports that there is a
scientific consensus agreement that is relied upon by the expert witnesses. This is important
because it gives support to the judge’s discretion that what the expert witness says is a reflection
of the consensus regarding eyewitness testimony in the field. This 70% agreement on what
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factors are scientifically-grounded enough to talk about on the stand gives evidence that the
expert witness is reflecting the scientific standards of their respected community and not
incorporating personal beliefs and biases regarding eyewitness testimony.
The judge does not want to worry about deciding if the expert witness is providing biases
or scientific facts regarding factors influencing eyewitness testimony. It is both advantageous for
the judge and jury if the expert witness is only providing information about factors affecting
memory that the scientific community regards as generally accepted. Leippe (1995) claimed that
the role of the expert witness is to essentially provide information to the jury and judge regarding
eyewitness testimony and memory that is based on the theoretically and empirically supported
notions that the majority of the scientific community has agreed upon. The Kassin et al. (1989)
study provided evidence in favor of expert testimony because the scientific community does
have a general consensus on what factors affect the memory process and eyewitness testimony.
Leippe (1995) analyzed one of the main arguments against using the expert witness in the
courtroom, namely the amount of skepticism that could be adopted by the jurors as a result of
hearing the scientific evidence that more than likely highlights the error rates of memory recall.
Woocher (1986) claims that by exposing the jury to the expert witness, it could completely
deflate the confidence that the jury has in being able to accurately tell if the eyewitness is telling
the truth. The bombardment of negativity regarding memory, recall, or eyewitness testimony
from the expert witness could be too much for the jury to cognitively handle and still be able to
reach a verdict that is not based on fear of mistakenly convicting someone (Woocher, 1986).
Making the jury completely unsure because they are afraid would not be beneficial for the court
because it takes away the sense of decision by a jury of peers. If they are too afraid to actually
make a decision of guilty because they fear that they are not smart enough to see the situation as
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the expert witness would, then it more than likely lowers the guilty rate. However, lowering the
guilty rate because of fear is not justice.
The skepticism effect argument does make sense in having the possibility of making the
jury too afraid to make a mistake. However, the goal of the expert witness is not to make the
jury afraid or significantly increase skepticism toward the eyewitness (Loftus, 1979). Instead, it
is to make the jury cognizant that there are certain factors that can impede the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony. Expert witness testimony is designed to be an aid for a jury that is
exposed to eyewitness testimony.
Leippe (1994) argues that jurors may have a false notion of ideas that consider the
accuracy of an eyewitness to be true. A considerable amount of research has been dedicated to
studying the impact of juror decision about the credibility of an eyewitness. The majority of
results show that jurors are not good at distinguishing between an eyewitness who is telling the
truth or not telling the truth (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells et al., 1981; Wells &
Leippe, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). Wells and Murray (1984) found that the level
of confidence a witness appeared to have in the accuracy of his or her testimony had a positive
correlation with the jury believing the witness’s account. Witnesses who were not telling the
truth were voted as telling the truth, ranging up to 80% of the participant jurors. This gives
evidence that expert testimony should be used because jurors tend to put too much faith in a
witness. Other studies have also shown that decisions on believing a witness are directly
influenced by the perceived level of confidence (Cutler et al., 1988; Whitley & Greenberg,
1986). These results also had another important factor because of the targeted participants.
College students, nonstudents, police officers, and attorneys showed that a witness’s degree of
confidence in testimony directly affects the person’s belief in accuracy of the witness. This is
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significant to applying expert testimony in the courtroom because of whom these studies
incorporated. They targeted a broader audience, which is more likely to represent a jury. If a
broader audience has trouble in detecting the accuracy of the witness because their verdict is
based upon confidence, then a jury is more than likely going to display similar results in their
verdict. Leippe (1995) argues that the pattern of jurors being swayed by an eyewitness’s
confidence in accuracy is one of the strongest reasons why there is a need to expose the jury to
an expert witness. . An eyewitness can have a significant amount of confidence but name the
wrong person as being guilty (Goodman & Loftus, 1992). People have shown to have
unshakable convictions that they know exactly what they remember even if there is evidence that
clearly proves the testimony is wrong. An expert witness can explain how factors such as
confidence do not guarantee that a witness is telling the truth. The expert witness could explain
what the scientific field has to say about the correlation of the amount of confidence and the
accuracy of an event.
Leippe (1995) also provided evidence that the courtroom operations of cross examination
are not reliable enough to allow the jury to see if the eyewitness is accurately recalling the event.
In fact, the opposite can occur when a witness is cross examined (Wells & Leippe, 1981). More
than likely, the witness has been told to stick to the story and details as much as possible so that
there will be little chance of the jury and attorney finding holes in the eyewitness testimony. If
the witness is able to make it through the cross examination, then it gives the jury more
confidence that the eyewitness may be telling the truth. Leippe (1980) showed that through the
repeated rehearsal of events, a person is likely to gain more confidence. This means that the
witness could not have the true story, but through enough rehearsal, the witness will more than
likely develop a higher sense of confidence. The development and demonstration of confidence
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in the eyewitness can lead to the jury being swayed (Cutler et al., 1988; Whitley & Greenberg,
1986). This evidence would also argue for the incorporation of expert witness because the cross
examination of the courtroom may not provide enough or the right kind of analysis that will
allow the jury to understand that the confidence level does not always positively correlate with
the degree of accuracy in the eyewitness’s recall.
Maass, Brigham, and West (1985) conducted a study that was similar to Loftus’s (1980)
results that showed the incorporation of expert testimony resulted in a lower conviction rate. The
group that had the eyewitness testimony and was exposed to an expert witness showed a lowered
conviction rate for defendants. A key finding in the Mass et al. study regarded the impact of
witness and expert witness exposed to the different groups. When no eyewitness was provided,
they created a group to compare the adjustment of the verdicts for groups that were given an
eyewitness and groups that were also given an expert witness. Compared to the group that did
not have an eyewitness, the group with the eyewitness raised its guilty verdict from 2.54 to 5.18,
which gives credit to the notion of jurors being more likely to convict when there is an
eyewitness ready to testify. The group that was exposed to an expert testimony showed a guilty
verdict of 3.57 on a 7 point scale. This is important to the field because it provides caution to the
fact that an eyewitness may not be telling the truth, but it also does not lower the skepticism as
low as the control group that did not have an eyewitness. Maass et al.'s results refute the
argument that incorporating an expert witness will make the jury become too skeptical to believe
the eyewitness. If this notion were true in this experiment, then the group exposed to expert
witness testimony would have had a lower score than the control group that did not have a
witness or expert testimony. Based on the results of this experiment, the incorporation of expert
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witness reduced skepticism in the credibility of the eyewitness, but not enough to completely
discredit the eyewitness.
Fox and Walters (1986) had groups that were exposed to two types of expert witnesses.
One group was exposed to general findings on memory and the other was given an in-depth
report on how certain factors affect eyewitness recall (Fox & Walters, 1986). They also exposed
the groups to an eyewitness who was perceived as confident or an eyewitness who did not
demonstrate confidence. Their results showed that a skepticism effect took place among the
jurors after being exposed to eyewitness testimony. The belief in the confident eyewitness
testimony went from 70% to 40% and the belief in the eyewitness that did not demonstrate
confidence dropped from 55% to 12% after being exposed to expert testimony. These results
show that when a jury is exposed to an expert witness, they will develop some sense of
skepticism effect. However, the results also show that a jury is still more likely to believe
eyewitness testimony if the eyewitness displays a high amount of confidence.
Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter (1989) found that exposure to expert testimony is likely to
enhance juror attention toward factors that affect memory, which is the overall goal of bringing
science into the courtroom. The expert witness is to provide the jury with more information
regarding eyewitness testimony than they knew before the expert took the stand. Leippe (1995)
proposes that it was not surprising that the experiments conducted involving expert testimony
caused the jury to develop some sort of skepticism regarding the eyewitness testimony. The
experiments were geared so that the introduction of expert testimony into the groups was to have
the jury be cautious toward certain factors, such as confidence, stress, or racial effect that could
cause the eyewitness’s testimony to be inaccurate. The experiments were designed as the same
purpose of having an expert testify in court; to have the jurors pay closer attention to the
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eyewitness testimony and to educate them on certain factors that can cause eyewitness testimony
to yield inaccurate results. Critics of using expert testimony in court argue that the empirical
results have showed the skepticism effect to be demonstrated by the jurors showing a decrease in
guilty verdicts. However, Leippe argues that naturally the jurors are going to increase their
amount of skepticism, but the empirical results showed that the incorporation of expert testimony
did not completely remove the guilty rates. Critics of expert testimony claim that the jurors
become so skeptical that there is significantly lower chance that the jury will convict anyone
because they are so afraid that they are making the wrong decision. Leippe says that if this were
true, then the empirical results would have demonstrated a disappearance of guilty verdicts by
participants that were exposed to expert testimony. The results showed a decrease in guilty
verdicts but did not show a disappearance in guilty verdicts.
Applying Interactive Learning to Expert Witness and Eyewitness Testimony
Chickering and Gamson (1987) argued that the process of learning is not simply listening
to someone explain ideas, rather, learning is a combination of listening and also interacting
through firsthand experience in problem solving. Chickering and Gamson encouraged active
learning as a way to overcome the barrier of trying to learn through simply listening. One
method of active learning is hands on participation in an activity. Hearns, Miller, and Nelson
(2010) conducted a study that compared hands on learning to simply watching a demonstration.
Participants were scored on being able to recall specific steps in the task process (Hearns et al.,
2010). They found that participants who participated in the hands on activity scored higher on
recall than participants who watched the demonstration.
Duckworth, Kreiner, Stark-Wroblewski, and Marish (2011) developed an interactive
approach toward exposing jurors to expert testimony. They used the experimental methods from
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the many previous empirical studies that sought to find a difference in the effect of expert
testimony exposed to jurors compared to jurors who did not receive expert testimony before
reaching a verdict (Duckworth et al., 2011). The experiment added a new condition for
participants. There was an additional independent variable that had the participants experience
an eyewitness activity. They referred to the new independent variable as an eyewitness
identification experience. This condition involved interactive participation so that the
participants would understand first-hand experience in eyewitness testimony.
Duckworth et al. (2011) used a 2x2 experimental design to compare the effect of
exposing mock jurors to expert witness testimony and the effect of participating in an expert
witness procedure. They had three groups of exposure effects and one control group (Duckworth
et al., 2011). The first group was exposed to eyewitness testimony and participated in the
eyewitness identification procedure. The second group was only exposed to expert testimony.
The third group was participated in the eyewitness identification procedure but was not exposed
to expert testimony. The fourth group was the control group, and therefore, did not participate in
the eyewitness procedure and did not hear from an expert witness.
The results of Duckworth et al. (2011) followed the supporting empirical evidence of
previous studies that showed expert testimony does provide lower guilty convictions by raising
awareness (Leippe, 1995). However, Duckworth et al. showed that exposure to expert testimony
only had a higher conviction rate than the control group. This result is interesting regarding the
arguments of opponents of expert testimony who have claimed that exposure to empirical
evidence regarding eyewitness testimony would significantly lower conviction rates. The group
that did not experience expert testimony but participated in the eyewitness procedure
demonstrated a lower conviction rate than the control and the group that only experienced expert
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testimony. The group that had exposure to expert testimony and participated in the eyewitness
procedure showed the lowest conviction rate of all the groups.
Duckworth et al. (2011) concluded that the students who participated in the eyewitness
identification procedure had a lower conviction rate because of the hands on experience they
received in dealing with having to become an eyewitness and trying to identify the culprit in their
eyewitness exercise. Scemakula (2001) and Verma (2003) suggested that when a person is given
actual hands-on experience in learning, he or she is able to grasp the difference between hearing
about information compared to actually participating in the learning activity. Through the many
empirical findings and experiments of the eyewitness process, the field of psychology has
findings that can be of direct assistance concerning memory recall for other disciplines (Leippe,
1995). Leippe (1995) even goes as far as placing an educational responsibility on the field of
psychology to inform the public and legal system of its empirical findings that could be of
benefit to society. Duckworth et al. is a prime example of applying learning and empirical
findings to the criminal justice system. Through the incorporation of interactive learning, the
participants in the Duckworth et al. study were able to better understand what it is like to be an
eyewitness. The participants were able to see the difficulty in recalling an event.
Duckworth et al.’s (2011) eyewitness identification procedure may have gone beyond the
desirable effect of expert testimony. Loftus (1980) called for the expert witness to be an aid in
providing the jury with a better idea of what factors influence eyewitness testimony. Duckworth
et al. gave participants a hands-on learning experience, which may have been the best way to
inform the jury on how difficult an eyewitness recall procedure can be for a person. Duckworth
et al.’s recent research involving an eyewitness identification procedure with expert testimony
could be a breakthrough in allowing a jury to become exposed to findings regarding eyewitness
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testimony and then participating in a hands-on experience. The jury would be receiving
information and experience regarding eyewitness testimony, which would allow them to better
relate to how an eyewitness may feel.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Participants
One-hundred fifteen undergraduate students from East Tennessee State University
participated in this study. Four undergraduate criminal justice classes voluntarily participated in
this study. The purpose of this study was to see if an effect would be present when applied to
East Tennessee State University undergraduate students. If the results did show significant
effect, then it could have been understood that the effect had been demonstrated under a specific
demographic of undergraduate students. Future research could have been directed toward seeing
if the results are constant when using different participants, such as respondents in the work force
and varying ages.
Participants were notified that their participation in this study was completely on a
voluntary basis and that no harm would come from this study. They were also notified that there
were no penalties for choosing not to participate and that they could choose to leave at any point.
The informed consent document was passed out, and the participants were notified that they
could obtain the results of the study if they were interested. Participants were then told they
would be serving as mock jurors that are hearing about a case of a woman accusing the
defendant of being the man that pulled a knife on her and stole her purse. The woman's
eyewitness testimony accusing the defendant was the only piece of evidence that the participants
saw pertaining to the case. The groups were based on their exposure to the independent
variables of expert testimony and eyewitness recall activity. Each class was designated as being
the control group, expert witness testimony group, eyewitness recall activity group, and the
combination group of expert witness testimony and eyewitness recall activity.
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Design and Procedure
This design was based on Duckworth et al.'s (2011) study where four groups of
participants were designated as the control group, exposure to the independent variable of expert
testimony, participation in the independent variable of an eyewitness activity, or combination of
the independent variables. The mock video of eyewitness testimony and mock video of expert
witness testimony were based off of the Duckworth et al. design, but the original content from
their study was not used. The independent variable of eyewitness activity participation was also
based off of Duckworth et al.'s study, but the original activity content from their study was not
used. In this study, the mock eyewitness testimony was recorded by the principal investigator.
The eyewitness testimony was a female who identified the defendant as the person who stole her
purse. The mock expert witness testimony was also recorded by the principal investigator. The
eyewitness recall activity in this study was used from the Saunders's (2009) study on the weapon
focus effect. The eyewitness recall activity was a five piece slideshow of a mock robbery
(Saunders, 2009). A male approached a female in an alley, pulled a knife on her, and then stole
her purse (Saunders, 2009). Participants watched the slideshow and then were asked to answer
questions concerning the incident, such as the color of his shirt, knife, hair, and other
identification questions to see how well the person was able to remember the incident. The
eyewitness recall activity slideshow (Saunders, 2009) was the same crime that the eyewitness
was testifying about. By having the eyewitness recall activity slideshow (Saunders, 2009) center
around the same crime of a purse robbery, it was supposed to give participants a better idea as to
what the eyewitness was testifying about. In other words, if the slideshow (Saunders, 2009) had
not been of a man robbing a woman for her purse, and instead would have been an eyewitness
recall activity relating to bird watching, it may have lessened their ability to relate to the
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eyewitness testimony due to the magnitude of difference between the two types of scenarios.
Providing a slideshow of the same type of scenario as the eyewitness testimony served as a way
for the participants to gain a more personal understanding to the type of event the eyewitness was
testifying.
This study was a 2x2 design made up of 115 participants. All four groups viewed the
mock eyewitness testimony and then filled out a survey. The survey consisted of questions
measuring the dependent variables. Participants were asked whether or not they found the
defendant guilty or not guilty. The participants were also asked if their exposure to the
independent variables of hearing expert witness testimony elaborate on the memory process and
the trouble with eyewitness recall provided them with assistance in reaching their final decision
of guilty or not guilty. They were given the choices of "not helpful", "somewhat helpful", and
"very helpful". Participants were also asked if their exposure to the independent variable of
participating in the eyewitness recall activity provided them with assistance in reaching their
final decision of guilty or not guilty. They were given the choices of "not helpful", "somewhat
helpful", and "very helpful". If participants were not exposed to the independent variable of
expert testimony or participation in the eyewitness recall activity, they were asked to identify the
same degree of helpfulness if they believed these procedures could have provided them with
assistance in reaching their final decision of guilty or not guilty.
The first condition was the control group. It received no exposure to either independent
variable of expert testimony or eyewitness recall activity. The first condition involved 24
participants who only watched a mock video of an eyewitness testimony and then filled out the
survey. The second condition involved 30 participants who were exposed to the independent
variable of hearing expert witness testimony. The group watched the mock interview of an
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expert witness testify on what the field of psychology has found regarding the use of eyewitness
testimony. After the mock expert witness testified, they watched the eyewitness testimony and
then filled out the survey. The third condition involved 28 participants who were exposed to the
independent variable of eyewitness recall activity that consisted of them watching a slide show
of a mock purse robbery from the Saunders (2009) study. The participants were then given a
questionnaire that asked about specific details in the slide show. After participating in the
eyewitness testimony activity, the group watched the eyewitness testimony video and then filled
out the survey. The fourth condition involved 33 participants who were exposed to the
independent variable of expert testimony and the independent variable of eyewitness recall
activity. After being exposed to both independent variables, the group watched the eyewitness
testimony video and then filled out the survey.
The survey also contained seven demographic variables. The demographic variables
were the participant's academic classification, gender, age, ethnicity, race, political affiliation,
and religiousness. The reason for including these variables within the survey was for control
purposes. If the exposure to hearing expert testimony showed to be statistically significant or if
participation in the eyewitness recall activity showed to be statistically significant, then further
analysis could have been done to see if any of these demographic variables had a significant
relationship to the main effects. These demographic variables served to have the capability of
allowing further analysis into why certain people voted guilty or not guilty. If there had been a
statistically significant finding in groups that were exposed to the eyewitness recall activity,
these variables would have allowed further analysis to see if a person's gender or age could have
been the reason as to why statistical significance was shown among participants who were
exposed to the eyewitness recall activity. If these demographic variables had not been included
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on the survey, then analysis would have ended with simply knowing there was significance
among participants in the group that were exposed to the independent variable of participating in
the eyewitness recall activity. By having these variables included, it allowed the possibility to
examine if certain demographics could have played a significant role behind the significance of
participating in the eyewitness recall activity.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Univariate Analysis
A univariate analysis was conducted in order to compare the demographic characteristics
of the sample. As Table 1 indicates, frequencies of the demographic variables academic
classification, sex, ethnicity, race, and age were used in order to see a reflection of the sample
type. Although there were more participants that were of junior classification, participants'
academic classification were relatively equal. The univariate analysis also showed the study
sampled a relatively equal number of males and females. As shown in Table 1, the demographic
variables of ethnicity, race, and age had little dispersion. The participants were predominantly of
non-Hispanic or non-Latino origin. The frequency distribution of race revealed the majority of
participants to be white. The study involved 101 white participants and 7 black or African
American participants. The demographic variable of age had a greater amount of dispersion
among participants, as can be seen in Table 1. The majority ages of participants were of the
traditional age range of college undergraduate students. The mean age of participants was 21.99,
which can be understood due to the numbers of juniors and seniors in the sample. Academic
junior and senior college students are usually within the range of 21 to 22 years of age.
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Participants
Variable

N

%

Freshman

26

22.6

Sophomore

29

25.2

Academic Classification
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Table 1 (continued)
Junior

34

29.6

Senior

25

21.7

Male

61

53

Female

53

46.1

7

6.1

Non-Hispanic or Non-Latino origin 105

91.3

Sex

Ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino origin

Race
Native American

1

.9

Black or African American

7

6.1

Pacific Islander

1

.9

White

101

87.8

Other

2

1.7

18

12

10.4

19

15

13.0

20

22

19.1

21

15

13.0

22

11

9.6

23

9

7.8

24

4

3.5

Age
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Table 1 (continued)
25

3

2.6

27

2

1.7

28

2

1.7

29

2

1.7

31

1

.9

32

2

1.7

34

1

.9

35

1

.9

39

1

.9

40

1

.9

11

9.6

missing
21.99 (mean)

The survey also asked the participants to identify their political affiliation as being very
liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, or very conservative. As can be seen in Table 2, the
participants' political affiliation was similar to a normal distribution. A political affiliation of
moderate was the most common, followed by a relatively equal spread descending outward. The
participants' degree of religiousness also served as a demographic variable in this study. The
results of the participants’ religiousness were similar to the normal distribution of the political
affiliation characteristic. As shown in Table 2, the participants' degree of religiousness reflects a
normal distribution. The majority of participants were somewhat religious, followed by an equal
number of participants claiming to be either not religious or highly religious.
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Table 2
Political Affiliation and Degree of Religiousness
Variable

N

%

4

3.5

Political Affiliation
Very Liberal
Liberal

23

20

Moderate

51

44.3

Conservative

27

23.5

6

5.2

Not Religious

24

20.9

Somewhat Religious

65

56.5

Highly Religious

24

20.9

Very Conservative
Degree of Religiousness

Binary Logistic Regression and Bivariate Analysis
The results were analyzed using logistic regression. Logistic regression would allow for
control over each variable. By controlling each variable, it would be possible to see which
independent variable had the strongest impact upon the dependent variable of voting guilty or not
guilty and, therefore, would allow for prediction. However, according to Table 3, significant
findings did not occur regarding the relationship of expert witness testimony or participating in
the eyewitness recall activity. The demographic characteristics did not show any significance, as
well. The only variable that did show significance was the helpfulness of expert witness
testimony, and this is addressed later by cross tabulation and chi-square.
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Table 3
Binary Logistic Regression on Final Decision
Variables in the Equation
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

expert testimony

.222

.577

.148

1

.700

1.249

eyewitness activity

-.353

.631

.313

1

.576

.703

helpfulness of expert

1.013

.431

5.512

1

.019

2.753

helpfulness of activity

.376

.411

.836

1

.361

1.457

class

-.376

.372

1.018

1

.313

.687

sex

.055

.508

.012

1

.913

1.057

.000

1

.999

.000

ethnicity

-20.55

17206

race

.330

.450

.538

1

.463

1.391

age

.121

.119

1.037

1

.309

1.129

-.327

.307

1.137

1

.286

.721

.145

.430

.114

1

.735

1.156

.000

1

.999

4.7x1015

political
religiousness
constant

36.101

34413

Cross Tabulation Frequencies and Chi-Square Tests
Because of small sample size and lack of significance, another method of analyzation
was used in order to find directional results and percentage comparison. In order to test the
hypotheses of this study, bivariate analyses were conducted in order to find the empirical
relationship of the designated independent and dependent variables. Cross tabulation frequencies
were run to show percentage comparisons and to see if the results were in the hypothesized
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direction of difference. Chi-square tests were run to see if there were statistically significant
effects among the variables.
The first hypothesis stated that there would be a significant relationship regarding the
final verdict of guilty or not guilty when the group exposed to the expert witness testimony was
compared to the control group. The first hypothesis was not supported by the East Tennessee
State University sample. As can be seen in Table 4, the cross tabulation frequency results were
not significant. A chi-square test revealed that there was no significant relationship (X2 (1) =
.500, p > .05). Because the results were not significant, the first hypothesis failed to reject the
null, in that, the group that received expert witness testimony was statistically independent of the
control group. Therefore, the first hypothesis was not confirmed. There was no existing
relationship regarding the final verdict of guilty or not guilty when the group exposed to the
expert witness testimony was compared to the control group.
Table 4
Cross Tabulation of the Control Group Compared to Expert Testimony
Final Verdict

Guilty

Not Guilty

Total

Group
Control

Expert Testimony

Total

Count

9

8

17

% of total

18%

16%

34%

Count

14

19

33

% of total

28%

38%

66%

Count

23

27

50

% of total

46%

54%

100%
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The second hypothesis tested the effect of the group's final verdict of guilty or not guilty
based on participation in the eyewitness recall activity. The second hypothesis stated that there
would be a significant relationship regarding the final verdict when the group that experienced
the eyewitness recall activity was compared to the control group. The second hypothesis was not
supported by the East Tennessee State University sample. Table 5 shows the cross tabulation
frequency for the eyewitness recall activity group compared to the control group. A chi-square
test revealed that there was no significant relationship (X2 (1) = 2.368, p > .05). Because the
results were not significant, the second hypothesis also failed to reject the null, in that, the group
which participated in the eyewitness recall activity was statistically independent of the control
group. Therefore, the second hypothesis was not confirmed. There was no existing relationship
regarding the final verdict of guilty or not guilty when the group that participated in the
eyewitness recall activity was compared to the control group.
Table 5
Cross Tabulation of the Control Group Compared to Eyewitness Recall Activity Group
Final Verdict

Guilty

Not Guilty

Total

Group
Control

Eyewitness Activity Total

Count

9

8

14

% of total

18.4%

10.2%

28.6%

Count

14

21

35

% of total

28.6%

42.9%

71.4%

Count

23

26

49

% of total

46.9%

53.1%

100%
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The third hypothesis tested the effect of the group's final verdict of guilty or not guilty
based on exposure of both the independent variables of hearing expert witness testimony and
participating in the eyewitness recall activity. The third hypothesis stated that there would be a
significant relationship regarding the final verdict when the group that experienced both the
expert witness testimony and participated in the eyewitness recall activity was compared to the
control group. The third hypothesis was not supported by the East Tennessee State University
sample. The cross tabulation frequency is shown in Table 6, but they did not show to be
significant when a chi-square test was conducted. A chi-square test revealed that there was no
significant relationship (X2 (1) = .061, p > .05). The third test also failed to reject the null, in
that, the group which heard the expert witness testimony and participated in the eyewitness recall
activity was statistically independent of the control group. The third hypothesis was not
confirmed. There was no existing relationship regarding the final verdict of guilty or not guilty
when the group that heard expert witness testimony and participated in the eyewitness recall
activity was compared to the control group.
Table 6
Cross Tabulation of the Control Group Compared to the Combined Variable Group
Final Verdict

Guilty

Not Guilty

Total

Group
Control

Both

Total

Count

9

14

23

% of total

16.1%

25%

41.1%

Count

14

19

33

% of total

25%

33.9%

58.9%

Count

23

33

56

51

Table 6 (continued)
% of total

41.1%

58.9%

100%

The group that heard expert witness testimony was asked how helpful it was in assisting
them in reaching their final decision of guilty or not guilty. The control group was asked how
helpful it would have been in reaching their final decision if they would have heard expert
witness testimony. The fourth hypothesis tested the effect on the degree of helpfulness in
hearing the expert witness testimony in deciding the final decision of guilty or not guilty
compared to the control group. This hypothesis stated that there would be a significant
relationship when the group that heard expert witness testimony was compared to the control
group regarding the degree of helpfulness in hearing expert witness testimony would serve in
helping reach the final decision of guilty or not guilty. The fourth hypothesis was not supported
by the East Tennessee State University sample. The cross tabulation frequency in Table 7 shows
that the group that heard expert testimony had a higher percentage rate for this independent
variable as somewhat helpful than very helpful. The control group actually rated that hearing an
expert witness testimony would have been very helpful in helping them reach their final decision
of guilty or not guilty based off of the woman's eyewitness testimony against the defendant.
These results could have been due to the control group not actually experiencing the
expert witness testimony. They may have believed it would have helped, but in reality, it may
have only been somewhat helpful. This could be explained by the group that heard expert
witness testimony. The group that heard expert witness testimony may have scored a higher
percentage on the expert being somewhat helpful because the expert did not actually help them a
significant amount regarding their final decision of guilty or not guilty. When statistically
analyzed for significant relationship among the two groups, a chi-square test revealed that there
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was no significant relationship (X2 (2) = 1.529, p > .05). The fourth hypothesis also failed to
reject the null, which means the fourth hypothesis was not confirmed. Therefore, the group that
heard expert witness testimony had no significant difference from the control group when
compared for the degree of helpfulness of the expert witness testimony aiding the participants in
their final decisions of guilty or not guilty.
Table 7
Helpfulness of Expert Testimony in Control Group Compared to Expert Testimony Group
Degree of Helpfulness

Not Helpful

Somewhat Helpful

Very Helpful

Total

Group
Control

Expert Testimony

Total

Count

1

2

3

% of total

1.9%

3.8%

5.7%

Count

9

15

24

% of total

17%

28.3%

45.3%

Count

14

12

26

% of total

26.4%

22.6%

49.1%

Count

24

29

53

% of total

45.3%

54.7%

100%

The group that participated in the eyewitness recall activity was asked how helpful it was
in their final decision, while the control group was asked how helpful they think it would have
been in reaching their final decision if they had participated in an eyewitness recall activity. The
fifth hypothesis also tested to see if statistical significance existed regarding the degree of
helpfulness in participating in an eyewitness recall activity toward the final decision of guilty or
not guilty. The fifth hypothesis stated that there would be a significant relationship when the
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group that participated in the eyewitness recall activity was compared to the control group on the
basis of how helpful this activity was or would have been regarding assistance to the final
verdict. The fifth hypothesis was not supported by this sample. As seen in Table 8, a cross
tabulation frequency showed that there did not seem to be profound differences between the two
groups when asked about the helpfulness of participating in an eyewitness recall activity to
provide assistance in the final decision of the woman's eyewitness testimony.
A chi-square tests was conducted to analyze the relationship of the two groups, and no
statistical significance was found (X2 (2) = .261, p > .05). Therefore, the fifth test failed to reject
the null. The fifth hypothesis was not confirmed. There was no significant relationship between
the group that participated in the eyewitness recall activity when compared to the control group
on the basis of rating the degree of helpfulness that participation did or would have contributed
to making the decision of guilty or not guilty.
Table 8
Helpfulness of Eyewitness Activity in Control Group Compared to Eyewitness Activity Group
Degree of Helpfulness

Not Helpful

Somewhat Helpful

Very Helpful

Total

Group
Control

Eyewitness Activity Total

Count

4

6

10

% of total

7.7%

11.5%

19.2%

Count

11

13

24

% of total

21.2%

25%

46.2%

Count

9

9

18

% of total

17.3%

17.3%

34.6%

Count

24

28

52

54

Table 8 (continued)
% of total

46.2%

53.8%

100%

Although the fourth hypothesis about a possible effect of helpfulness in reaching the final
verdict of guilty or not guilty when the group exposed to expert witness testimony compared to
the control group was insignificant (p >.05), there was a group comparison that showed a
significant difference in the degree of helpfulness regarding expert witness testimony. Cross
tabulation frequency, as seen in Table 9, showed the comparison of these two groups. When the
group that only participated in the eyewitness recall activity compared to the group that heard the
expert witness testimony and participated in the eyewitness recall activity was tested for
significance based upon their idea of degree of helpfulness in hearing an expert witness
testimony during an eyewitness case, a chi-square test revealed that these two groups showed a
statistically significant relationship (X2 (1) = 4.04, p = .036).
As shown in Table 9, the comparison of the eyewitness recall activity group was
compared to the group that heard expert witness testimony and participated in the eyewitness
recall activity based upon the degree of helpfulness in hearing expert witness testimony revealed
significant relationship and one of moderate strength. The Phi value revealed a moderate
strength of inverse relationship, Phi= -.294. Phi was chosen as the method of interpreting the
symmetric values of the relationship because the variable degree of helpfulness in expert
testimony had to be transformed into a two-level response instead of three (not helpful,
somewhat helpful, or very helpful) due to the count in the first level being less than five.
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Table 9
Helpfulness of Expert Witness Testimony in Eyewitness Activity Group Compared to Both
Degree of Helpfulness

Group
Eyewitness Activity Both

Somewhat Helpful

Very Helpful

Total

Total

Count

9

16

25

% of total

17.6%

31.4%

49%

Count

17

9

26

% of total

33.3%

17.6%

51%

Count

26

25

51

% of total

51%

49%

100%

Chi-Square test

Pearson Chi-Square

Value

df

Asymp. Sig (two-sided)

4.404

1

.036

Symmetric Measures

Phi

Value

Approx. Sig

-.294

.036
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Comparison of Results to the Duckworth et al. (2011) study
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether or not an effect would be shown
when East Tennessee State University students served as mock jurors in an eyewitness testimony
case that was presented with the independent variables of hearing an expert witness discuss what
psychology has found regarding eyewitness testimony, the independent variable of participating
in an eyewitness recall activity, or both. This design was based on Duckworth et al.’s (2011)
study, where participants that took part in the eyewitness procedure showed a main effect for the
likelihood of guilt. Duckworth et al. conducted a chi-square test of independence which revealed
participants in the eyewitness procedure were more likely to give a verdict of not guilty.
However, the Duckworth et al. study did not find an effect regarding participants that heard
expert witness testimony. This study did not find an effect for participants who experienced the
eyewitness recall activity, nor did it find an effect for participants who were exposed to expert
witness testimony.
Overall, this study did not show any statistically significant findings regarding the
hypotheses. This study also showed findings different from the Duckworth et al. (2011) results.
The contrasting findings of Duckworth et al.'s study compared to this study's findings at East
Tennessee State University could be due to different demographic characteristics of the students
who participated. The limitations of this study could also have served as a reason why this study
showed findings different from the comparison study. The difference in mock presentation of
the eyewitness testimony, the expert witness testimony, and the eyewitness activity could also be
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why participants in this study did not demonstrate significant effects as participants did in the
Duckworth et al. study.
As the demographic findings in Table 1 demonstrated, the East Tennessee State
University undergraduate students in this sample had a similar sampling size of freshmen,
sophomores, juniors, and seniors and almost an equal number of males and females. The
Duckworth et al. (2011) study involved more freshmen and sophomore participants than
upperclassmen. This study had more upperclassmen participants. The difference in academic
classification makeup could have been a factor in the decision-making process. However, there
were no significant differences when each academic classification was statistically compared.
Future research could be done to see if the decision-making process of freshmen compared to
juniors or seniors is different. According to the sex demographic variable in Table 1, the
percentage of male to female is relatively equal in this study. The Duckworth et al. study
showed male to female ratio to be relatively equal as well. The race demographic variable in the
Duckworth et al. findings and this study of East Tennessee State University students showed
similar proportion regarding race, with white being the dominant category. The age
demographic variable of both studies was very similar. The Duckworth et al. study had a mean
age of 22.59, while this study showed a mean age of participants to be 21.99 years of age.
Limitation of Sample Size
The limitation of sample size could be a major factor in this study not revealing
significant findings. It is a stretch to say that a sample size of below 50 participants would
produce significant findings. A larger sample size would possibly help produce significant
findings. A larger sample size would help the study sample become closer to an actual
reflection of the population parameters. The sample in this study could also not be an accurate
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reflection of the population parameters at East Tennessee State University. Only four classes
were sampled, and all of them were criminal justice classes. This study did not take into account
any of the other majors across the university. It could also be argued that only four classes of the
entire criminal justice major are not an accurate reflection of the entire major due to the
abundance of classes that are offered in criminal justice.
An attempt to address the sample size limitation would be to gain a larger number of
participants and a broader sampling of classes across the university. Because statistical
significance was not found within these classes, it would serve as a greater benefit to broaden the
sample to classes across the university. Sampling only classes within the criminal justice courses
was an attempt to find significance in this specific parameter so that it could serve as a
comparison for future research. The findings in the criminal justice courses could have been
used to compare findings in chemistry courses, business courses, or music courses.
Limitation of Different Independent Variables
Another reason that this study did not show significant findings compared to the
Duckworth et al. (2011) study could have quite possibly been related to the fact that although the
design of this study was based on the Duckworth et al. design, the variables were not the same
content. The variables did differ in ways that could have served to be the explanation for why
this study did not show statistical significance. This principle investigator of this study
shortened the time of delivery for the mock trial. Duckworth et al. had a much longer length of
mock trial video. Only one attorney was used to question the defendant, as compared to
Duckworth et al.'s study, which used two attorneys to question the eyewitness.
The eyewitness testimony was not the original content from the Duckworth et al. (2011)
study. The eyewitness testimony was filmed by the principle investigator. This difference could
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have affected decisions of guilty or not guilty. The expert witness testimony was also filmed by
the principle investigator, and was therefore different from the original content used by the
Duckworth et al. study. The eyewitness activity was also different in this study. The
combination of not having the original content of both independent variables of the Duckworth et
al. study could have been a confounding factor in why this study showed no significant results.
Limitation of Effort by Participants
Another reason as to why this study failed to show statistical significance or prove any of
the hypotheses could have been due to the personal state of the participants. Some participants
wrote on the survey that they had trouble hearing or understanding the expert witness testimony.
Because these participants were unable to hear or understand the expert witness, it more than
likely affected their ability to understand all of the information concerning memory and
eyewitness testimony. One participant who was supposed to participate in the eyewitness recall
activity failed to watch the slideshow. Because this participant failed to watch the slideshow,
there is no way that this participant could have appropriately been exposed to this independent
variable. Relating the activity to a personal level was the purpose of the independent variable
because it would enable the participant to personally understand that eyewitness recall is not
always an accurate mechanism. This participant's data was thrown out, but there could have
been more participants who did not pay attention to directions.
Participants may have paid attention to directions but did not care to actively participate
or give the desired amount of effort that the principal investigator wanted. If the participants did
not give adequate effort in playing the roles of a mock jurors, then the effect upon the dependent
variable of voting guilty or not guilty due to the exposure from the independent variables of
expert witness testimony and eyewitness recall activity could have been significantly damaged.
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The effect of the independent variables upon the dependent variables would be in this state of
"damaged" if the participants failed to pay attention, failed to follow directions, did not care, or
were confused in the overall process. Any of these mishaps could have been a reason that
contributed to the hypotheses not being confirmed.
Future Research Implications
In regards to future research conducted on the effect of expert testimony or other methods
of hoping to find a way to cause an effect on judging eyewitness testimony, this study provided
information to be aware of by the next investigator. This study was based on and compared to
the Duckworth et al. (2011) study, but it did not show the same results. Moreover, sample size
was a large factor that contributed to results that were statistically insignificant. Future research
on this study should attain a larger sample. Although none of the hypotheses were confirmed,
other researchers could take the many elements of this study and gain a more accurate reflection
of the total population mean regarding a juror's perception of eyewitness testimony and methods
that could accurately assist them in deciding the guilt of a person accused by eyewitness
testimony.
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APPENDIX
Survey
group 1
Please Circle your academic classification, gender, ethnicity, race, and identify your age.
Academic Classification:

Freshman

Gender:

Male

Female

Ethnicity:

Hispanic or Latino origin

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Other
Not Hispanic or Latino origin

Race: Asian Native American Black or African American Pacific Islander White Middle
Eastern Other
Age:
Please circle which answer best describes your view:
1.

How would you identify your political affiliation?
Very Liberal

2.

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Very Conservative

How would you describe your degree of religiousness?
Not Religious

Moderately Religious

Highly Religious

Please answer each of the following questions:
Based upon the eyewitness testimony, do you find the defendant guilty or not guilty?
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survey (continued)
Do you think having someone explain in further detail what psychologists have found
concerning eyewitness memory would have been helpful in making a decision?

Circle and

explain.
Not helpful

somewhat helpful

very helpful

Do you think participating in an interactive learning activity based upon eyewitness recall would
have been helpful in making a decision? Circle and explain.
Not helpful

somewhat helpful

very helpful
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